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This study examines the direct impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
on the cost of bank debt in a strictly Candian context.  Bank loan information for 
large, publicly owed, Canadian firms is combined with CSR ratings to form a 
dataset with 64 observations covering 2004-2005.  After controlling for specific 
firm and loan characteristics with known effects on cost of bank debt, the results 
show CSR scores to have no significant implact on the cost of bank loans (as 
measured by the spread over LIBOR).  The results also suggest that the dataset 
was of insufficient quantity to confidently establish relationships.  Data covering 
a larger range of years yeilding many more usable observations should be used 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
Corporate Social Responsibility (hereafter CSR) has drawn continuously 
increasing attention in recent years.  The general population has shown 
increasing interest in a number of environmental and social issues over the past 
decade.  As a result, many firms now include reports on their social, ethical and 
environmental conduct in their annual reporting.  Furthermore, marketing 
departments commonly display being ‘green’ and/or ‘social’ as a relevant 
characteristic of a product or firm.  A rapidly growing body of research focused 
on CSR and any potentially related business characteristics has accompanied 
this increased attention.   
Research into CSR expenditure remains controversial.  Classical finance 
theory supports the notion that any expenditure that does not strive to 
maximize firm value is a deviation from managerial responsibilities.  Therefore 
any CSR initiatives, unless they also serve to maximize firm value, are a misuse 
of scarce resources.  This has become known as the shareholder view.  The 
shareholder view believes governing bodies should control any negative 
externalities that can result from shareholder wealth maximization.   
There is an alternative view known as the stakeholder view, which 
supports the notion that a firm has a responsibility to all its stakeholders.  
Examples of such stakeholders include employees, business partners, 
consumers, and the community as well as shareholders.  Proponents of the 
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stakeholder view even argue that it does not contradict the shareholder view.  
That is, they argue that pleasing all stakeholders creates a more productive and 
efficient firm and may actually increase financial performance.  For example: 
happier employees will reciprocate with more loyalty and productivity, better 
relationships with business partners can decrease costs, and being viewed as an 
‘ethical’ company will be rewarded by consumers.   
The major roadblock in consolidating the two views is that many of these 
benefits are troublesome to measure and have a delayed onset. It is difficult to 
confidently attribute CSR directly as the cause of increased sales, productivity or 
cost savings.  The debate continues as to whether CSR investments are value 
enhancing or offer any positive return on investment. 
Relationships have been established between CSR and financial 
performance (Scholtens, 2008), CSR and firm value (Jo & Harjoto, 2011) and 
between CSR and financial risk (Boutin-Dufresne & Savaria, 2004).  While these 
are important characteristics that have an indirect effect on the cost of debt, this 
paper will focus specifically on the relationship between CSR and the cost of 
bank loans in Canada.   
This relationship was explored in the paper “The cost of virtue: corporate 
social responsibility and the cost of debt financing” by Goss and Roberts in 2007.  
Goss & Roberts (2007) reported a relationship between CSR and the cost of bank 
debt showing significance only at low levels of CSR, resulting in higher loan 
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spreads for such firms.  Insignificant relationships were found at medium and 
high levels of CSR.  Goss & Roberts (2007) examined this relationship in an 
American context; this paper will include only Canadian firms in its sample.  
The results will serve two purposes: a comparison showing whether or not 
Canadian firms and banks place an increased or decreased premium on CSR, 
and an indication to Canadian firms of this premium for use in corporate 
financial decisions. 
Equity financing can be a much more complex issue, as investors can 
have agency costs or multiple agendas.  Investors can be easily swayed by 
trends, emotions, and personal agendas.  The effect of CSR on the cost of equity, 
while it may yield meaningful results, is likely to include a large behavioral 
component and is well beyond the scope of this paper.  Examining the cost of 
bank financing, however, should provide a much more clear-cut indication of 
the rightful effect CSR has on financing costs by “exploiting the unique role of 
banks as ‘quasi-insiders’ of the firm” (Goss & Roberts, 2007, p. 3).  Banks have 
access to firm information that may not be available to other shareholders, and 
they have the level of expertise required to use all such information in order to 
establish appropriate loan terms.  The particular loan term of interest here will 
be the loan spread over the London InterBank Offer Rate (hereafter LIBOR).   
Perhaps an even more important characteristic of banks than their 
enhanced ability to establish appropriate loan terms is their assumed lack of a 
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social agenda.  It can be assumed that banks will not favour CSR levels on any 
basis other than how they impact a firm’s ability to repay their loan.  It is this 
key assumption that will give meaning to the discovered results.  If increased 
levels of CSR truly improve a firm’s expected financial ability to meet its loan 
obligations then such firms should have smaller loan spreads.  If classical 
finance theory is correct in its assertion that CSR investing is a misuse of scarce 
resources, such firms should have greater spreads. 
CSR can be evaluated using a number of methods.  The Kinder, 
Lydenberg and Domini & Co. (KLD) ratings are widely used for U.S. firms.  For 
Canadian firms, the Jantzi Research Group provides ratings that are widely 
recognized and respected.  This paper will control for other factors effecting 
loan spreads and attempt to determine the effect of CSR on loan spreads.  Goss 
& Roberts (2007) are believed to be the first to examine this particular 
relationship, so this appears to be a first look at this issue in Canada. 
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2. Chapter 2: Literature Review 
CSR has been linked to numerous firm characteristics and performance 
measures over the last two decades.  Firm performance has been reported to be 
positively, negatively, and neutrally affected by CSR in various studies.  
McWilliams & Siegel (2000) reported CSR as having a neutral impact on 
financial performance and went on to state that model misspecification was 
responsible for inflated estimates of the financial impact of CSR.  Such models 
failed to include a control variable for research and development expenditure, 
which has been shown to have a significant influence on firm performance 
(Hall, 1999).   
The link between financial performance and CSR is a multidimensional 
issue; at first glance there appears to be a highly justified, strong correlation.  
Improved relationships with all stakeholders should naturally lead to stronger 
financial performance through several channels.  Firstly, better relationships 
with employees should result in more driven, loyal workers.  This leads to 
greater levels of productivity.  Secondly, a better public image and higher level 
of customer satisfaction leads to sustainable revenue growth.  However, as 
McWilliams & Siegel (2001) outline, CSR can be thought of as an unnecessary 
expenditure, not a necessary factor of production.  Such an expenditure can be 
increased and decreased as capital is available.  When approached in this 
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capacity, the link between financial performance and CSR should seemingly 
travel in the opposite direction: stronger financial performance allows for greater 
CSR expenditure.   
McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis (1988), using long-term firm 
performance as measured by accounting and financial information, found that 
CSR has a closer relationship to past performance than to future performance.  
Scholtens (2008) also found evidence of the causal direction to be from financial 
performance to social performance.  In a Canadian context, Mahoney & Roberts 
(2007) found no significant relationship between overall CSP and financial 
performance.  Once again using Canadian firm data, Mahoney & Thorne (2005) 
did however report a link between long-term compensation of corporate 
executives and CSR levels, suggesting that such compensated top executives 
believe it to be in the best long-term interest of the firm to maintain higher levels 
of CSR. 
Financial risk is the firm characteristic of greatest importance in this 
paper.  More specifically, does CSR on its own make a firm less risky?  The cost 
of bank debt depends solely on a firm’s perceived ability to repay the debt.  This 
ability is broken down into many factors including financial performance, 
default probability, and credit rating, among others.  Since banks have both the 
expertise and the resources required to properly assess this ability, their results 
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can be very meaningful in both corporate finance and capital structure 
decisions. 
Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami & Suh (2013) reported a significant positive 
impact of CSR on credit ratings of a firm.  They reported this positive impact 
using overall CSR scores as well as using certain individual components of CSR.  
Higher credit ratings for any firm decrease the firm’s cost of debt without 
question.  According to Attig et al. (2013), CSR expenditures can act as a signal 
of a firm’s efficiency, reduce the likelihood of incurring unexpected costs due to 
irresponsible actions, and legitimately increase performance as per the 
stakeholder view.  Any of these three results of CSR will, certeris paribus, 
increase a firm’s credit rating. 
Boutin-Dufresne & Savaria (2004) also discovered a significant, negative 
relationship between CSR and financial risk, albeit through the much different 
process of evaluating stock returns: “Judged by two different methodologies, 
socially responsible companies tend to show less diversifiable risk in their stock 
behavior than non-socially responsible companies.” (Boutin-Dufresne & Savaria, 
2004, p. 57). 
The aforementioned studies, however, do not provide the direct link 
being pursued in this paper.  CSR levels demonstrating an impact on certain 
characteristics (profitability, stability, credit rating) that, in turn, have an impact 
on the cost of bank debt will not be exposed in this paper.  Such characteristics 
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will be controlled for in the model(s) and a potential link directly from CSR to 
cost of debt will be investigated.  Since the impact of CSR on several risk factors 
will be controlled for, it is hypothesized that CSR alone will not impact loan 
spreads because of the controls in place and the impartial nature of banks. 
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3. Chapter 3: Methodology 
A clear definition of the terms “CSR” and “cost of bank debt”, in the 
context of this paper, must be established before the model can be properly 
defined.  Cost of bank debt will refer to the interest rate charged on a bank loan, 
and since interest rates vary over time, the spread over the London InterBank 
Offer Rate (LIBOR) is the key loan characteristic here.  The spread is expressed 
in basis points and will be the dependent variable in the model.  Information is 
collected from the Dealscan database, which provides all loan characteristics. 
Quantifying CSR is an extremely challenging process and could not be 
done independently.  A number of rating systems exist; and although the major 
rating agencies base their evaluations on in-depth research and material 
information, all evaluations contain some elements of subjectivity that naturally 
leave the ratings exposed to criticism.  A database from KLD Research & 
Analytics Inc. is generally accepted as the industry standard for CSR ratings in 
the United States, however the Jantzi Canadian Social Investment Database 
(CSID) provides a multidimensional measure of CSR for all large, publicly held, 
Canadian firms.  The CSID database with full CSR ratings of Canadian firms 
was provided for this paper, containing a 2-year sample range (2004-2005).  CSR 
will hereafter refer to the Jantzi ratings given in the CSID. 
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Jantzi Research Inc. has been a leader in the field of providing objective 
assessments of CSR for Canadian firms for over 20 years.  The Jantzi ratings are 
very similar to the KLD ratings of American firms in that they both provide a 
comprehensive set of ratings for various dimensions of CSR (Mahoney & 
Thorne, 2005).  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to dissect CSR ratings 
and examine evaluation methods, this section will provide an overview of the 
methodology employed by Jantzi Research Inc.  
Jantzi Research Inc. publishes the CSID containing comprehensive ratings 
of over 300 publicly traded firms and income trusts.  The Jantzi research process 
includes a thorough examination of all available information on the social and 
environmental performance of each firm.  Firms also receive a questionnaire 
regarding their practices, results of which are verified by methods such as: 
direct contact with key stakeholders, public filings, media and government 
sources, and on-line databases.  Firms are given scores in six areas: employees, 
the environment, human rights, customers, corporate governance, and 
community & society.  Each area contains many indicators relating to programs, 
performance, etc.  Each indicator is scored, and weighted tallies are used to 
arrive at a total within each of the six broad areas.  Finally, a single overall score 
is calculated.   
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Jantzi’s researchers carry a high level of expertise and are independent of 
the companies being rated, and their criteria are mainly objective and are 
consistently applied to all rated companies.   
Firm characteristics and performance measures have been gathered and 
compiled from the Compustat Database.  Compustat is a database maintained 
by Standard & Poor; it contains fundamental financial and market data on all 
large publicly owed firms.  A wide range of companies and individuals in the 
financial industry use the Compustat Database for the purposes of investment, 
research, and statistical analysis among many others. 
Dataset construction began with the Dealscan database, which contained 
105,345 observations spanning from 1982-2012.  Dropping all non-Canadian 
companies brought it down to 2,147 observations.  Focusing only on loans from 
2005-2006 (in order to suit CSR ratings from 2004-2005), the dataset was further 
trimmed to 418 observations.  The Jantzi CSID provided contained 443 
observations representing Canadian companies for 2004-2005.  Merger of these 2 
datasets resulted in 171 observations, representing Canadian companies that 
appeared in both the Dealscan database and the CSID.  However, of these 171 
observations, loan spread information was missing from 107, this left a final 
dataset containing 64 usable observations containing all loan and CSR 
information.  Firm characteristics were then gathered from Compustat and 
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merged with the existing dataset, and any missing firm information was 
individually recovered through further research of financial statements. 
Univariate analysis of spread and CSR values will provide valuable 
insights into any necessary adjustments to the model.  For example, Goss & 
Roberts (2007) used the spread in log form in their regression analysis due to 
skewness discovered through univariate analysis. 
Ideally this type of information would suit a fixed effects (FE) model to 
control for company differences.  This could be done with panel data where 
each observation has a specific company and year.  However this is not a true 
panel dataset: each loan is, in effect, its own observation, and there is an 
insufficient span of time for a FE model.  A simple OLS regression is most 
appropriate to begin with.  A generalized method of moments (GMM) model 
was used by Goss & Roberts (2007) “because we do not know the form of any 
potential heteroskedasticity ex ante” (p. 16).  Caution will be exercised with OLS 
and if data suggests GMM is necessary, it will be used.  Equations will take the 
general form of: 
ln(spread) = f(firm characteristics, loan characteristics, CSR) 
There is a very mature body of research on the determinants of loan 
spreads; this has been a topic of many studies.  There are known characteristics, 
both firm-specific and loan-specific, that have a documented deterministic effect 
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on loan spreads.  These characteristics will be controlled for in an attempt to 
isolate the effects of CSR on spreads.  CSR scores will be lagged 1-year in all 
regressions.  Scores for the same year that a loan was granted would not have 
been available at the time of the loan since scores are given at the end of a time 
period (year) to reflect actions up to and including said time period.  Firm 
specific information used in regressions is, similarly, the information from the 
most recent completed fiscal year. 
Firm-specific controls: 
 Size: Firm size has been shown to effect loan spreads, with larger firms 
being viewed as less risky and benefitting from lower spreads.  The size 
control variable in the model will be in the form of ln(total assets). 
 Leverage:  Firms pay higher spreads as they become increasingly 
leveraged.  Leverage will be measured as long term Debt/Equity. 
 Secured Status: Dummy variable showing if the loan is secured.  Secured 
loan spreads are expected to be lower than otherwise identical, unsecured 
loans. 
 EBIT: Earnings are a definite indicator of a firm’s ability to repay its 
loan(s).  Earnings are scaled by size (total assets) to avoid 
multicollinearity. 
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 Z-score: The Altman’s Z-score is a commonly used metric for credit risk.  
Higher scores indicate lower default probabilities and therefore should 
also indicate lower spreads. 
 Industry Dummies: Control for any industry effects.  A series of dummy 
variables are created based on 2-digit SIC codes. 
Loan-specific controls: 
 Maturity:  Although the effect of maturity on spreads is not certain, it will 
be controlled for. 
 Loan type: A series of dummy variables indicating the type of loan 
(revolvers, bridge loans, term loans, and others). 
 Loan Purpose: Another series of dummies indicating what the loan will 
be used for, as this can have an effect on the spread. 
 Syndicated: Dummy variable indicating if the loan is syndicated, 
syndicated loans are expected to have higher spreads. 
 LIBOR: 1-month U.S. dollar LIBOR at the time of the loan is used as an 
indicator of the economic conditions present at that time. 
Regression results and univariate analysis will dictate the need for further 
testing, and further test models. 
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4. Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
  CSR data were only available for this study covering 2004-2005, and as 
discussed, combining with the Dealscan database loans during 2005-2006 left 
only 64 observations.  This creates difficulty in univariate analysis as a larger 
sample is often required before trends and patterns can present themselves.  
Jantzi ratings in this sample range numerically from 3.6 to 6.8.   
Caution must be exercised since these scores are not continuous, meaning 
the magnitude of the scores should not be interpreted as specifically meaningful 
beyond providing an order, or relative performance.  Further explained, one can 
interpret a score of 6.0 to be “better” than a score of 3.0 because 6.0 is larger.  
However, it should not be inferred that such a score is “twice as good” as 3.0.  
Similarly, an increase from 3.9 to 4.0 should not be seen as equivalent to an 
increase from 5.9 to 6.0.  This issue will not restrict the regressions since it is the 
directional impact that is of interest in this study.  Actual, numerical value is not 
being sought here, but rather if there exists a statistically significant impact of 
CSR scores on bank loan spreads. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
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 The distribution of Jantzi ratings is given in Figure 1.  As depicted, 
sample scores do not follow a normal distribution, the highest concentration of 
scores are found in the top 10% and bottom 30% of the range.  There are no 
outliers, so there is no need to winsorize the CSR data.  The distribution of the 
CSR scores allows for further analysis into the lower and upper quartiles in 
order to investigate any significant relationships between these outer quartiles 
and loan spreads.  Goss & Roberts (2007) reported a discovery that firms with 
the lowest scores did tend to pay higher spreads than the rest of the firms, 
however the cost of debt of higher rated firms was indistinguishable from the 
group.  This discovery suggested that firms should have incentive to avoid very 
low CSR scores, but that they should be indifferent between medium and very 
high scores.  Firms did not seem to have any incentive, from a cost of debt 
perspective at least, to achieve very high CSR scores.  Further analysis on these 
quartiles will be discussed later in the paper. 
 
Insert Table 1 
  
Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are given in Table 
1.  Average loan spread is 197.2188 basis points and the distribution is positively 
skewed, which is expected because spread is highly unlikely to be below zero.  
As a result of this skewness, following Goss & Roberts (2007), the logarithmic 
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form of spread will be used as the dependent variable in the regressions that 
follow. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
Table 2 displays summary statistics of the same variables, now showing 
the variables grouped by CSR ratings into the upper and lower quartiles.  It 
should be noted that based on the sample size, these quartiles only have 16 and 
15 observations respectively.  As shown, the sample mean loan spread is 
actually higher for the group with high CSR scores.  This is counterintuitive 
since one would hypothesize that if any difference existed at all, it would be that 
lower spreads would be awarded to firms with high CSR ratings.  After all, 
higher CSR ratings are certainly seen as “better”.  Perhaps this is a signal that 
banks are, as hypothesized, indifferent to CSR ratings on their own.  Even if a 
significant difference in spread were identified at this stage, it would be 
incorrect to blindly attribute the difference to the CSR scores.  The two groups 
also differ heavily in company size, earnings, Z-score, and leverage.   
The sample CSR scores are strongly correlated with company size and 
earnings, which is expected since size and earnings are strongly correlated with 
each other.  This strong correlation with CSR follows the assertion that CSR 
attributes are normal goods (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001).  As companies grow in 
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size and gain greater earnings and resources, their demand for CSR attributes 
increases and this should result in higher CSR ratings.  The Z-score 
characteristics are interesting in this sample.  Higher Z-scores are desirable, as 
they indicate a lower default probability, and the upper quartile has a mean Z-
score of 0.9133 while the low quartile has a mean Z-score of 3.6626.  This 
suggests that firms with the highest CSR ratings in our sample have a greater 
default probability than the firms with the lowest CSR ratings.  This does not 
suggest CSR ratings as the cause of the Z-score values, however it is 
counterintuitive and is opposite of the findings of Goss & Roberts (2007). 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
The first regression is run as the method in Chapter 3 specifies.  With the 
dependent variable being log transformed, the coefficient of independent 
variables represent the percentage change in the dependent variable for each 
unit change in the corresponding independent variable. 
 
Insert Table 3 
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Regression results are displayed in Table 3, however there is very little 
definitive information within the results.  Industry Dummies do not appear to 
be serving their intended purpose, 2 of the 7 have been omitted due to 
collinearity and the rest show insignificant coefficients.  Type and Purpose 
Dummies also show insignificant coefficients.  Coefficients on several variables 
with previously demonstrated impacts on loan spreads are not statistically 
significant in this regression; variables such as firm size, earnings, leverage, and 
Z-score.  This is a clear indication that this sample does not behave as expected, 
or it is simply not large enough.   
Industry Dummies were removed from the regression in model 2 for 
several reasons: Their impact could be distorting the reported impact of the 
remaining variables in the model, they all show as insignificant or collinear, and 
several other variables already control for relevant firm characteristics that 
would otherwise be partially captured in the industry dummies (which may 
explain the collinearity).  This brings the variable coefficients to a higher level of 
significance in general, however the only coefficients that are statistically 
significant at the 5% level remain to be market-to-book, LIBOR, and secured 
status.  Again, useful information cannot be obtained from a model that has 
been manipulated.   
Looking at the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) provides great insight into 
multicollinearity.  The variance of an estimated regression coefficient is a major 
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factor in determining statistical significance of said coefficient.  VIF measures 
how much this variance is increased due to collinearity.  VIF information is 
provided in Table 4. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
VIF on the size measure (8.51) in particular is a serious problem, 
compounded by even higher VIFs on many of the dummy variables.  In model 
2, with the industry dummies removed, VIF analysis shows highly reduced 
inflationary results, however the remaining dummy variables along with size 
(5.81) remain higher than acceptable.  It is generally accepted that acceptable 
VIFs are close to 1, even 2, 3, or 4 could be seen as acceptable, but above 5 is 
problematic.  Interestingly, O’Brien (2007) argued against the commonly 
accepted rule of 10 in the paper “A Caution Regarding Rules of Thumb for 
Variance Inflation Factors”, stating that higher values do not necessarily 
discredit regression results.  Furthermore, O’Brien (2007) stated that making 
changes because of high VIFs (dropping and/or combining certain independent 
variables) often creates more problems than they cure.   
 
Insert Table 5 
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Table 5 shows the results of regressions identical to Table 3 except instead 
of CSR rating, there are 2 dummy variables representing the lower and upper 
quartiles of the firms in terms of CSR ratings.  This is done to investigate the 
possibility that the extreme levels of CSR scores have some effect on loan 
spreads even though the general CSR scores do not have a statistically 
significant impact across the sample.  Again the results show several dummies 
omitted for collinearity and essentially no significant estimators.  Similarly, VIF 
analysis still shows a strong presence of collinearity.   
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5. Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Although CSR interest has taken a firm grasp on the corporate world, 
there remains little agreement on its direct financial effects.  Education on the 
subject continues to expand and firms spend their scarce resources on CSR 
activities, and CSR reporting and advertising.  This paper examined the 
potential direct link between CSR and the cost of bank debt.  Cost of bank debt 
is a critical component of firm operations and capital structure; hence any 
known direct link to CSR will be extremely valuable. 
Based on the regression analysis and the dataset available, there is no 
indication that CSR scores have a significant, measurable impact on the cost of 
bank loans.  These results follow the assumption that banks, when evaluating a 
firm’s borrowing capabilities, do not have interest in CSR levels alone.  CSR has 
proven effects on other firm characteristics influencing financial risk, but they 
are controlled for in the models used in this paper.  However, the data used in 
this study proves to be of very low quality, such that even significant results 
would not be able to be reported with confidence. 
There are several variables in the models that represent characteristics 
with known, significant impacts on loan spreads (Z-score, earnings, size, 
leverage, loan purpose).  Even these relationships could not be identified in the 
sample.  Any small number of such characteristics displaying unexpected 
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results would be of interest, however when essentially all estimators are shown 
to be insignificant, it becomes obvious that the data is insufficient.  Attempts can 
be made to contort the data to alleviate certain problems, but the model cannot 
be changed in order to show significant results.  In terms of the relationships 
being investigated, the only possible discovery is a weakly significant indication 
that higher CSR values actually lead to higher loan spreads.  Sample size would 
need to be much larger in order be confident in this paper’s results. 
I believe the process is sound, as indicated by Goss & Roberts (2007), I 
simply believe the data available to be of a quality far too low to obtain 
meaningful results.  My recommendation would be to obtain a higher quality 
dataset for a future test. Many observations from the Dealscan database 
contained loans with missing spread information, and CSR ratings data from 
Jantzi was only available for a 2-year period for this study.  When these datasets 
where combined, the limitations of each were compounded by one another, 
resulting in only 64 observations and an unknown reasoning for certain 
dropped observations.  With a larger, more complete dataset I believe this study 
could be greatly improved and the impact of CSR ratings on loan spreads, 
whether present or not, could be reported with confidence. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Depedent Variable 
logspread  Natural logarithm of the initial all-in-drawn spread over 
LIBOR 
Dealscan 
      Firm Related Independent Variables 
logsize Natural logarithm of total assets Compustat 
relebit EBIT scaled by total assets Compustat 
markettobook 
Market value of equity divided by book value of equity, 
commonly used as a proxy for growth opportunities 
Compustat 
Zscore 
(EBIT/total assets)x3.3 + (Net Sales/total assets)x0.99 + 
(market value of equity/total liabilities)x0.6 + (working 




Book value of long term debt divided by market value of 
equity 
Compustat 
industrydummies There are 7 industry dummies representing 8 categories 
based on 2-digit SIC codes: Mining (SIC 10-14), 
Manufacturing (SIC 20-39), Transportation, communications, 
electric and gas (SIC 40-49), Wholesale (SIC 50-51), Retail 
(SIC 52-59), Finance, insurance and real estate (SIC 60-67), 
Services (SIC 70-89), and non-classifiable as the omitted 
category.  All data observations fit into one of these 
categories. 
Dealscan 
csr Overall csr score from Jantzi Research Co. CSID 
lowCSR Lower quartile of csr CSID 
highCSR Upper quartile of csr CSID 
      Loan Related Independent Variables 
maturity Loan maturity in months Dealscan 





secured Equal to 1 if the loan is secured and 0 otherwise Dealscan 
syndicated Equal to 1 if the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise Dealscan 
typedummies Dummy variable series with 3 categories describing the loan 
type: term loans, lines of credit, and all other loans as the 
omitted category. 
Dealscan 
purposedummies Dummy variable series with 3 categories describing loan 
purpose: takeovers & recapitalizations, project finance, and 
general corporate purposes as the omitted category. 
Dealscan 
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1st Quartile 4.3 
Median 5.0 
3rd Quartile 5.8 
Maximum 6.8 
Mean 5.125 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
spread 64 197.2188 123.599 14 465 
csr 64 5.125 1.0260 3.6 6.8 
maturity 64 52.4375 21.0305 12 84 
libor 64 4.3757 0.8335 2.6859 5.4045 
at 64 69248.72 145061.8 220.409 469521 
ebit 64 1387.405 2495.453 -91.074 8814 
markettobook 64 2.7002 2.0518 0.5223 12.1039 
lev 64 0.3369 0.4038 0 1.5446 
Zscore 64 3.3326 4.0654 0.2018 22.1657 
logsize 64 8.5587 2.3887 5.3955 13.0595 
relebit 64 0.0553 0.0713 -0.1030 0.2098 
logspread 64 4.9982 0.9004 2.6391 6.1420 
      
Indicator Variable Obs Obs = 0 Obs = 1   
secured 64 35 29   
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
spread Low 225.6667 85.0602 100 450 
 High  315.25 135.0647 65 465 
csr Low 3.96 0.2223 3.6 4.2 
 High  6.5938 0.2792 5.9 6.8 
maturity Low 48.6 23.9010 12 84 
 High  36.75 20.7702 12 72 
libor Low 4.8052 0.6838 3.5107 5.3479 
 High  4.1411 0.8760 2.6859 5.3198 
at Low 2442.513 5045.275 220.409 14845 
 High  260291.6 190698 638.022 469521 
ebit Low 76.2358 139.3123 -91.074 391 
 High  4608.229 3291.534 4.706 8814 
markettobook Low 2.8115 1.5533 1.0196 5.0235 
 High  2.2446 0.6383 0.5223 2.7994 
lev Low 0.2967 0.5204 0.0520 1.5446 
 High  0.1817 0.0945 0.0655 0.3188 
Zscore Low 3.6626 1.8634 1.5782 6.1080 
 High  0.9133 1.0560 0.2018 2.9791 
logsize Low 6.5610 1.3690 5.3955 9.6054 
 High  11.0340 2.7832 6.4584 13.0595 
relebit Low 0.0678 0.1215 -0.1030 0.2098 
 High  0.0286 0.0232 0.0012 0.0888 
logspread Low 5.3568 0.3658 4.6052 6.1092 
 High  5.6323 0.5624 4.1744 6.1420 
      
Indicator Variable  Obs = 0 Obs = 1   
secured Low 4 11   
 High 12 4   
syndicated Low 0 15   
 High 11 5   
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 Model 1 Model 2 
 logspread logspread 
csr 0.330* 0.258 
 (2.23) (1.94) 
   
logsize -0.130 -0.113 
 (-1.47) (-1.48) 
   
relebit -2.252 -2.356 
 (-1.35) (-1.60) 
   
markettobook 0.0280 0.0982* 
 (0.45) (2.04) 
   
Zscore -0.0131 0.00496 
 (-0.40) (0.17) 
   
lev -0.183 0.186 
 (-0.59) (0.68) 
   
maturity -0.00703 -0.00666 
 (-0.96) (-1.02) 
   
libor 0.241* 0.341** 
 (2.09) (2.97) 
   
syndicated 0.145 -0.615 
 (0.24) (-1.23) 
   
secured 0.614* 0.530* 
 (2.68) (2.32) 
   
typedummy1 0.155 -0.142 
 (0.30) (-0.33) 
   
typedummy2 -0.541 -0.828* 
 (-1.19) (-2.29) 
   
purposedummy1 -0.0318 -0.0844 
 (-0.06) (-0.20) 
   
purposedummy2 -0.542 -0.379 
 (-0.83) (-0.57) 
   
 36  
industrydummy1 0.220  
 (0.34)  
   
industrydummy2 -0.0233  
 (-0.05)  
   
industrydummy3 -0.367  
 (-0.67)  
   
industrydummy4 0  
 (.)  
   
industrydummy5 0  
 (.)  
   
industrydummy6 0.911  
 (1.40)  
   
industrydummy7 -0.266  
 (-0.43)  
   
_cons 3.482* 3.964*** 
 (2.29) (3.54) 
N 64 64 
t statistics in parentheses 
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Table 4: Variance Inflation Factors 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 VIF VIF VIF VIF 
csr 4.42 3.24   
logsize 8.51 5.81 8.46 5.55 
relebit 2.72 1.92 3.27 1.91 
markettobook 3.13 1.71 4.32 1.74 
Zscore 3.32 2.47 4.71 2.87 
lev 2.99 2.14 3.76 2.26 
maturity 4.53 3.25 5.08 3.67 
libor 1.77 1.60 1.83 1.67 
syndicated 10.77 6.78 9.84 7.34 
secured 2.55 2.29 3.51 2.30 
typedummy1 12.14 7.52 12.98 7.63 
typedummy2 9.91 5.62 9.86 5.71 
purposedummy1 5.77 3.79 6.23 3.83 
purposedummy2 1.27 1.20 1.43 1.21 
industrydummy1 9.70  11.01  
industrydummy2 10.55  10.42  
industrydummy3 5.01  5.16  
industrydummy4     
industrydummy5     
industrydummy6 15.52  17.52  
industrydummy7 4.42  4.84  
lowCSR   4.42 2.53 
highCSR   4.53 3.24 
     




















 Model 3 Model 4 
 logspread logspread 
lowCSR 0.0111 0.167 
 (0.03) (0.61) 
   
highCSR 0.512 0.814* 
 (1.40) (2.66) 
   
logsize -0.107 -0.0637 
 (-1.17) (-0.87) 
   
relebit -1.911 -2.315 
 (-1.00) (-1.61) 
   
markettobook 0.0619 0.105* 
 (0.81) (2.19) 
   
Zscore 0.0173 0.0290 
 (0.43) (0.94) 
   
lev 0.000248 0.321 
 (0.00) (1.16) 
   
maturity -0.00437 -0.00405 
 (-0.54) (-0.60) 
   
libor 0.233 0.297* 
 (1.92) (2.59) 
   
syndicated -0.155 -0.364 
 (-0.26) (-0.71) 
   
secured 0.584* 0.470* 
 (2.08) (2.09) 
   
typedummy1 -0.0207 -0.197 
 (-0.04) (-0.46) 
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typedummy2 -0.693 -0.777* 
 (-1.46) (-2.18) 
   
purposedummy1 -0.298 -0.108 
 (-0.56) (-0.26) 
   
purposedummy2 -0.496 -0.341 
 (-0.69) (-0.52) 
   
industrydummy1 -0.270  
 (-0.38)  
   
industrydummy2 -0.276  
 (-0.56)  
   
industrydummy3 -0.361  
 (-0.62)  
   
industrydummy4 0  
 (.)  
   
industrydummy5 0  
 (.)  
   
industrydummy6 0.467  
 (0.65)  
   
industrydummy7 -0.455  
 (-0.67)  
   
_cons 5.180*** 4.352*** 
 (4.14) (4.31) 
N 64 64 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
